The Internet of things (IoT) is composed of billions of sensing devices that are subject to threats stemming from increasing reliance on communications technologies. A Trust-Based Secure Routing (TBSR) scheme using the traceback approach is proposed to improve the security of data routing and maximize the use of available energy in Energy-Harvesting Wireless Sensor Networks (EHWSNs). The main contributions of a TBSR are (a) the source nodes send data and notification to sinks through disjoint paths, separately; in such a mechanism, the data and notification can be verified independently to ensure their security. (b) Furthermore, the data and notification adopt a dynamic probability of marking and logging approach during the routing. Therefore, when attacked, the network will adopt the traceback approach to locate and clear malicious nodes to ensure security. The probability of marking is determined based on the level of battery remaining; when nodes harvest more energy, the probability of marking is higher, which can improve network security. Because if the probability of marking is higher, the number of marked nodes on the data packet routing path will be more, and the sink will be more likely to trace back the data packet routing path and find malicious nodes according to this notification. When data packets are routed again, they tend to bypass these malicious nodes, which make the success rate of routing higher and lead to improved network security. When the battery level is low, the probability of marking will be decreased, which is able to save energy. For logging, when the battery level is high, the network adopts a larger probability of marking and smaller probability of logging to transmit notification to the sink, which can reserve enough storage space to meet the storage demand for the period of the battery on low level; when the battery level is low, increasing the probability of logging can reduce energy consumption. After the level of battery remaining is high enough, nodes then send the notification which was logged before to the sink. Compared with past solutions, our results indicate that the performance of the TBSR scheme has been improved comprehensively; it can effectively increase the quantity of notification received by the sink by 20%, increase energy efficiency by 11%, reduce the maximum storage capacity needed by nodes by 33.3% and improve the success rate of routing by approximately 16.30%.
Introduction
Ubiquitous sensor-based devices (e.g., sensor nodes, wearable sensing devices, and smartphones) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] have been playing a vital role in the evolution of the Internet of Things (IoT) [2, [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] , The advantage of a marking-based traceback scheme is that it has lower network requirements and can be used for both wired and wireless networks. However, its most apparent disadvantage is that the energy consumption of the wireless sensor network is affected significantly; therefore, the network lifetime is shortened because in the marking scheme, a basic marking unit will be added to the transmitted marking once the routing data passes through a node. As the routing continues, the length of the data packet becomes long, and an increasing amount of data will be transmitted by sensor nodes. The nodes in the area near the sink carry much more data than those far from the sink. After the marking scheme is adopted, the local notes will load the data multiple times compared with the data loaded by nodes in areas far from the sink. In this case, the unbalance of network energy consumption is aggravated and the lifetime is significantly shortened. To reduce the damage caused by the notification to network energy, some researchers propose a probability-based marking scheme, which changes the scheme of marking every node in the conventional schemes and adopts a scheme of marking each node based on probability. The probability-based marking scheme has an advantage of effectively reducing the number of marking nodes and the energy consumption of the system to transmit the notification [47] . Conversely, the scheme has a lower ability to trace malicious nodes. In this scheme, the marking is not added for every node, so some nodes will be omitted during the reconstruction of a routing path from the source node to the sink; therefore, the routing data for such omitted nodes must be contained in other collected data to construct the complete path. However, collecting more data requires a long time, i.e., prolongs the convergence time, which is one of the important indexes of scheme performance. Reference [52] proposed an improved scheme against such a case. The main idea of their scheme is adopting different marking probabilities based on the security status of the network. When the network is secure, a smaller probability of marking is adopted; when the number of network attacks is increasing, the probability of marking is also increased correspondingly. The network is usually secure, so a smaller probability of marking is usually adopted and the greater probability of marking is only adopted for short periods. Therefore, the overall effect is that network security can be effectively guaranteed, the number of marking nodes is not large, and network lifetime is long.
(b) Logging-based traceback scheme. The logging-based scheme is another malicious node tracing technology [48] . The above introduction shows that the marking-based traceback approach adds many loads to the network, which affects the network lifetime. This logging scheme adopts the following approach to reduce the effect of notification on the network lifetime. Its essential idea is that each node in the network has a fixed storage capacity. Therefore, the storage capacity of nodes in the network can be fully utilized to store the notification on these nodes instead of sending it to the sink. When the network is attacked, these nodes will be requested to send the notification to the sink for traceback. Then, the traceback path can be reconstructed. Therefore, the specific approach to adopt the logging scheme is that the node adds the notification to the passing data packet with a certain probability, and when the quantity of notification in the data packet reaches a certain value, such as k, all notification will be recorded on nodes through the logging process. The notification that has been recorded on nodes will not be forwarded during the routing of subsequent data packets to the sink. The adopted scheme can effectively reduce the amount of data to be transmitted by the network and save network energy. CPMLT (combined packet marking and logging scheme for traceback) [53] is a representative of this type of scheme.
Although logging scheme can reduce the energy consumption of a network, the reduction is achieved at the cost of node storage space. Therefore, this type of scheme requires a certain storage capacity. In addition, the unbalanced utilization of storage capacity remains in the wireless sensor network, i.e., the storage space of nodes far from the sink area is not fully utilized, but that of nodes near the sink area is insufficient. This shortfall exists because the nodes constantly store the notification during the routing to the sink; thus, more notification should be recorded by logging near the sink area, and less should be recorded far from the sink area.
In the traceback approach, the key to reconstructing the traceback path is to obtain more notification better. Therefore, both marking and logging schemes are trying to obtain as much notification as possible. Reference [54] analyzed and obtained the general traceback approach in which a serious unbalance exists in the network between the consumption of energy and storage consumption. Specifically, the unbalance is that more energy and storage space are consumed in nodes near the sink area, but nodes far from the sink area have much remaining battery level and storage space. In view of this case, Reference [54] proposed a logging and migrating (LM) traceback scheme because the non-hotspot areas in the sensor network have over 90% remaining battery level and storage space, but the remaining storage space and battery level are insufficient near the sink area. In the LM traceback scheme, the marking data packets log all their notification on the nodes before approaching the hotspot area, and the non-hotspot nodes have remaining battery level and storage space, so logging the notification in the non-hotspot areas in advance will greatly reduce the pressure of battery level and storage space in the hotspot area. Moreover, the nodes near the hotspot areas store much notification, so when the storage space is insufficient, the notification logged in these areas will be migrated to remoter nodes with remaining space, which significantly improves the amount of notification stored by the system compared with the conventional schemes. Thus, the scheme performs well in lengthening network lifetime and storing notification. 
Data Aggregation Model
This paper adopts a typical data aggregation model similar to that described in the literature [58] . In such a data aggregation model, when the network collects data, some nodes are selected as aggregators and other nodes are simple nodes. Each simple node determines which aggregator it belongs to with the clustering algorithm in Reference [58] and then sends its own data packet to the aggregator directly. If the simple node belongs to aggregator , the simple node is called a member node of the aggregator. The aggregator aggregates data packets sent by all member nodes into one data packet.
When aggregator receives the data packet sent by a member node , it will aggregate the data packet sent by and the existing data packet of aggregator ( might be the original data packet of aggregator or an intermediate result during the data aggregation of member nodes by aggregator , collectively expressed with ). ( , ) is used to indicate the final result of the data aggregation of two nodes , . The calculation formula is as follows:
( , ) = max( , ) + (1 − , )min ( , )
where , is the correlation coefficient between nodes and . A larger , indicates a higher correlation between the data of nodes and a smaller length of data packet formed after the data aggregation.
Security Model
This paper assumes that the attacker tends to be very intelligent. The security attack against the network is largely blocking and dropping data packets in the network, thus damaging the functions of the network. For example, the sink cannot react to the monitored events in the network if it fails to receive the monitored data packets, so the harmful event will cause serious loss to the network. Blocking the routing of some important data packets will cause an incorrect decision of the sink because it fails to receive sufficient notification. For example, the attacker adopts a proper operational mode to capture a small part of data, steals and modifies the program in the part, which helps the attacker control the nodes that have obtained legal status and allows it to lodge various attacks. The Attacker is able to drop data packets with a certain probability (if the drop probability is 1, then it is a black hole attacker; otherwise, it is likely to be a selective forwarding attacker or a Denial of Service (DOS) attacker) and cause maximum harm to the network without exposing its own identity. On the one hand, attackers can also forge real nodes to launch various attacks, such as false data injection attacks. 
Data Aggregation Model
This paper adopts a typical data aggregation model similar to that described in the literature [58] . In such a data aggregation model, when the network collects data, some nodes are selected as aggregators and other nodes are simple nodes. Each simple node determines which aggregator it belongs to with the clustering algorithm in Reference [58] and then sends its own data packet to the aggregator directly. If the simple node S i belongs to aggregator S j , the simple node is called a member node of the aggregator. The aggregator S j aggregates data packets sent by all member nodes into one data packet.
When aggregator S j receives the data packet sent by a member node S i , it will aggregate the data packet D i sent by S i and the existing data packet S j of aggregator S j (S j might be the original data packet D j of aggregator S j or an intermediate result S j during the data aggregation of member nodes by aggregator S j , collectively expressed with S j ). X S i , S j is used to indicate the final result of the data aggregation of two nodes S i , S j . The calculation formula is as follows:
where c i,j is the correlation coefficient between nodes S i and S j . A larger c i,j indicates a higher correlation between the data of nodes and a smaller length of data packet formed after the data aggregation.
Security Model
This paper assumes that the attacker tends to be very intelligent. The security attack against the network is largely blocking and dropping data packets in the network, thus damaging the functions of the network. For example, the sink cannot react to the monitored events in the network if it fails to receive the monitored data packets, so the harmful event will cause serious loss to the network. Blocking the routing of some important data packets will cause an incorrect decision of the sink because it fails to receive sufficient notification. For example, the attacker adopts a proper operational mode to capture a small part of data, steals and modifies the program in the part, which helps the attacker control the nodes that have obtained legal status and allows it to lodge various attacks. The Attacker is able to drop data packets with a certain probability (if the drop probability is 1, then it is a black hole attacker; otherwise, it is likely to be a selective forwarding attacker or a Denial of Service (DOS) attacker) and cause maximum harm to the network without exposing its own identity. On the one hand, attackers can also forge real nodes to launch various attacks, such as false data injection attacks. On the other hand, attackers can also collude to launch attacks, making the problem more complicated. However, if most nodes in a network are malicious nodes, network safety cannot be guaranteed [58] . Therefore, in this paper, we assume that the proportion of malicious nodes is small, for example, less than ς.
Energy Consumption Model
In this paper, we adopt the simplified X-MAC energy consumption model. X-MAC belongs to asynchronous competition MAC protocols. In these protocols, all nodes maintain their own duty cycle, and the transmitter and receiver are asynchronous. Thus, the receiving node might be in sleep status when the sending node sends the data out, and the LPL (Low-Power Listening) leader sequence technology will be adopted to wake up the receiving node. Therefore, in the X-MAC energy consumption model, the energy consumption power of each sensor node primarily includes the following two parts: (1) power of data packet sent or received by the node represented by R and T ; and (2) power required for the lower power motoring operation represented by x LPL . The main parameters of the WSN model adopted by this paper are similar to those of the X-MAC model, and the equipment limits are sourced from the internal data fragments of the prototype of the Thales sensor node [42] . Table 1 lists the values of all parameters. 
Problem Statement
The main goal of this paper is to design a secure routing scheme using a traceback approach for EHWSNs that makes full use of available energy to ensure data integrity and improve data security. The approach can be characterized as follows:
(1) Data integrity. Assurance to the recipient of the data came from the expected sender and has not been altered in transit, although the data is sent to the sink after data aggregation and multi-hop routing. (2) Maximizing the probability of successively routing the data packets to the sink. The probability of successively routing data to the sink can be defined as the ratio between the number of data packets received by the sink and the total number of data packets sent by the network. The maximum data routing success rate can be computed as follows: where F t represents the total number of data packets sent in the network, and F r represents the number of data packets successively received by the sink. Moreover, notice messages reaching the sink also have a positive effect on network safety. They record the nodes that the routing path of data packets passes and then restore the routing path. If the sink receives the notice message but fails to receive the linked data packet or receive the altered data packet, it will find the malicious nodes attacked by tracing the source path of data packet through the notification with a high probability. Therefore, the TBSR scheme will also improve the success rate for notice messages to reach the sink:
where A t represents the total number of notification sent in the network, and A r represents the number of notice messages received by the sink.
(3) Maximizing energy utilization
Energy utilization is the ratio of the energy consumed by the network to the available energy of the network within an hour, as shown in Equation (4):
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where is the -th node in the network, is the total number of nodes in the network, represents the energy consumption of within an hour, and ℰ represents the available energy of within an hour, which is calculated according to Algorithm 1. The maximization of network energy utilization will improve the effective use of network energy so that the ratio of energy consumed to the available energy in the network is largest.
(4) Network lifetime
In EHWSNs, the node will not die if the remaining battery level is maintained above 0 or a lower limit at any time. The storage capacity of a sensor node is limited, so the demand for storage capacity of nodes will not exceed the upper limit of the storage capacity of the sensor node. We assume that when the required storage capacity of node in the strategy is , the maximum storage capacity required by the node is the smallest for the scheme, i.e., as follows:
(6) Minimizing convergence time Γ
Convergence time is the time taken by the information synchronization process after the router identifies the change of the topology structure of the network. Actually, when the victim is attacked, the attack path is reconstructed by consulting the information of upstream nodes and broadcasting malicious information.
min(Γ)
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In EHWSNs, the node will not die if the remaining battery level is maintained above 0 or a lower limit at any time.
(5) Minimizing demand for storage capacity of nodes
The storage capacity of a sensor node is limited, so the demand for storage capacity of nodes will not exceed the upper limit of the storage capacity of the sensor node. We assume that when the required storage capacity of node in the strategy is , the maximum storage capacity required by the node is the smallest for the scheme, i.e., as follows:
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4. TBSR Scheme Design
Research Motivation
The security problems of wireless sensor networks have been discussed for a long time and widely emphasized and researched in industrial and academic circles. The trust-based secure routing using traceback approach (TBSR) scheme in this paper is proposed to address the following problems concerning the secure routing of a network in the past research:
(1) The past multi-path routing schemes consume much energy and cannot ensure data integrity.
The research objective of secure data collection is to ensure the monitoring data of sensor nodes can be routed to the sink safely. The attacker can appear at any position in the network, and the data packet can be attacked when it passes the area in which the attacker is located and then dropped. The principle of avoiding such attack is bypassing the area in which the attacker is located. However, the location of attacker cannot be determined in advance and bypassed. Therefore, most research adopts a multi-path or disjoint routing approach. The main feature of this approach is that multiple data packets are simultaneously sent to the destination through different routing paths, so although some routing paths are attacked, some data packets can reach the sink safely. The research [31] proposed the multi-path routing approach to defend against a selective forwarding attack. The multi-path routing approach sends multiple data packets through different routing paths. Thus, when the data packet on one path is attacked and dropped, the data packet can nonetheless reach the sink through other paths. Obviously, the multi-path scheme ensures data security to some extent. Nevertheless, the scheme has the disadvantage of sending one data packet multiple times, which increases energy consumption by a multiplier and seriously affects the network lifetime. Another important disadvantage of the scheme is that it cannot ensure data integrity. If the data packet is altered, it cannot be identified by the sink. (2) The existing scheme to ensure the data integrity cannot avoid dropping of the data packet.
Reference [59] proposed an ID-based aggregate signature scheme that can add a signature during data aggregation. The proposed scheme is able to ensure that the data packet with the signature can be authenticated, thereby ensuring data integrity. However, the scheme of adopting a digital signature cannot prevent the data packet from being dropped by the attacker. (3) Although we proposed an Aggregate Signature-based Trust Routing scheme (ASTR) [58] that combines the digital signature and security data routing, the function of locating malicious nodes remains a requirement, so the scheme remains a positive secure defense approach. In ASTR scheme [58] , the node sends M data and N abstract packets (known as R(M, N ) routing approach) to ensure both data routing security and data integrity. Despite high-energy consumption when the node sends M data and N abstract packets, this research continues to lack the function to determine the position of malicious nodes.
Above all, how to design an active scheme to locate the malicious nodes and ensure data routing security and data integrity is a challenging issue. In this paper, we propose a scheme that integrates the traceback approach, adopts the ID-based aggregate signature method and routes data packets and notification through multiple paths. It both reduces the energy consumption and ensures the Sensors 2018, 18, 751 13 of 44 security and integrity of data. The TBSR scheme has the following features: (a) adopt the ID-based aggregate signature scheme to ensure the information can be authenticated; (b) multiple data packets and notification are generated simultaneously during the routing. The notification is used to determine whether the data packet has reached the destination safely and has the advantage of small size and low energy consumption; (c) the most important point is that it integrates the traceback scheme. The principle of the Traceback scheme to ensure security is to attach the ID number of nodes that data passes to the data packet when it is routed to the sink with a certain probability. This ID number information is called notification. Obviously, the more notification the sink receives, the more routing information of data packets will be contained in the notification when the network is attacked, so the amount of notification reflects the ability of the network to locate the malicious nodes. Therefore, in the traceback scheme, the probability of marking should be as high as possible. However, a higher probability of marking will increase the amount of notification and energy consumption of the network, which can affect the network lifetime. Its difference from the past traceback scheme is that EHWSNs can absorb solar energy, and the TBSR scheme cleverly designs the probability of marking and logging of nodes, which enable the scheme to make full use of the absorbed energy to improve network security. The scheme adopted by the TBSR is that when sensor nodes absorb sufficient energy, a high probability of marking and a low probability of logging are used. In this case, the sink can obtain more notification and improve network security. When nodes absorb less energy, for example at night, a low probability of marking and a high probability of logging can be used to store the notification on the nodes in the network instead of sending them to the sink immediately. In this case, when the network cannot absorb sufficient energy, a lesser amount of data can be transmitted in the network, which saves energy. When the battery on high level, the notification recorded on the nodes in the network by logging scheme will be sent to the sink. Overall, the scheme obviously improves system security and the availability of energy; (d) finally, the TBSR scheme uses the malicious node location function of the traceback to reduce the trust of malicious node and guides the data to bypass the nodes with low trust during the routing, which further improves the security of the system.
Trust-Based Secure Routing Scheme Design
This section discusses the detailed design of the TBSR scheme. The TBSR scheme is shown in Figure 2 . It is primarily composed of the following important parts: (1) data aggregate signature, (2) a data and notification disjoint routing approach, and (3) a traceback approach. Therefore, in the traceback scheme, the probability of marking should be as high as possible. However, a higher probability of marking will increase the amount of notification and energy consumption of the network, which can affect the network lifetime. Its difference from the past traceback scheme is that EHWSNs can absorb solar energy, and the TBSR scheme cleverly designs the probability of marking and logging of nodes, which enable the scheme to make full use of the absorbed energy to improve network security. The scheme adopted by the TBSR is that when sensor nodes absorb sufficient energy, a high probability of marking and a low probability of logging are used. In this case, the sink can obtain more notification and improve network security. When nodes absorb less energy, for example at night, a low probability of marking and a high probability of logging can be used to store the notification on the nodes in the network instead of sending them to the sink immediately. In this case, when the network cannot absorb sufficient energy, a lesser amount of data can be transmitted in the network, which saves energy. When the battery on high level, the notification recorded on the nodes in the network by logging scheme will be sent to the sink. Overall, the scheme obviously improves system security and the availability of energy; (d) finally, the TBSR scheme uses the malicious node location function of the traceback to reduce the trust of malicious node and guides the data to bypass the nodes with low trust during the routing, which further improves the security of the system.
This section discusses the detailed design of the TBSR scheme. The TBSR scheme is shown in Figure 2 . It is primarily composed of the following important parts: (1) data aggregate signature, (2) a data and notification disjoint routing approach, and (3) a traceback approach. (1) aggregate signature stage In this stage, ID-based aggregate signature technology [58] is adopted in the ASTR scheme ID-based aggregate signature can ensure the source nodes can send the data packets to the aggregator and the aggregator performs the aggregate signature and sends them to the sink after multiple hops, which can provide assurance to the recipient of the message came from the expected sender and has not been altered in transit [58] . Hence, in ASTR scheme, the data packets are not directly sent to the sink but sent after data aggregation, which effectively reduces the data amount loaded by nodes (see Figure 2) . The process of (1) aggregate signature stage In this stage, ID-based aggregate signature technology [58] is adopted in the ASTR scheme ID-based aggregate signature can ensure the source nodes can send the data packets to the aggregator and the aggregator performs the aggregate signature and sends them to the sink after multiple hops, which can provide assurance to the recipient of the message came from the expected sender and has not been altered in transit [58] . Hence, in ASTR scheme, the data packets are not directly sent to the sink but sent after data aggregation, which effectively reduces the data amount loaded by nodes (see Figure 2 ). The process of data aggregation is shown in Figure 2 . When the node s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 intends to send the data packets to the sink, they will select one node among them, such as node s 0 as the aggregator while other nodes become the member nodes of aggregator node s 0 and send data packets to the aggregator node s 0 . After receiving the data packets sent by all member nodes, the aggregator node s 0 adopts the aggregate signature scheme in Reference [58] to aggregate them into one data packet and sends the packet to the sink (if M > 1, the data packet will be sent to the sink in a method similar to multi-path routing). Reference [58] has shown that the data aggregation method can be authenticated for each data of node. The selection of aggregator is similar to that of cluster head, which can be found in Reference [58] .
(2) A data and notification disjoint routing approach This section primarily discusses how to effectively route the data packet and notice message to the sink, i.e., a data and notification disjoint routing approach. M data packets are sent each time using the multi-path routing scheme, and notification is generated for each data packet during the routing process through marking. Both data packet and notification are routed to the sink.
The procedure for this approach is as follows: first, an aggregator produces M copies of the data packet during one operation and sends all copies to the sink through M different paths. As shown in Figure 2 , aggregator s 0 first generates a random number sink (if ℳ>1, the data packet will be sent to the sink in a method similar to multi-path routing). Reference [58] has shown that the data aggregation method can be authenticated for each data of node. The selection of aggregator is similar to that of cluster head, which can be found in Reference [58] .
(2) A data and notification disjoint routing approach
This section primarily discusses how to effectively route the data packet and notice message to the sink, i.e., a data and notification disjoint routing approach. ℳ data packets are sent each time using the multi-path routing scheme, and notification is generated for each data packet during the routing process through marking. Both data packet and notification are routed to the sink.
The procedure for this approach is as follows: first, an aggregator produces ℳ copies of the data packet during one operation and sends all copies to the sink through ℳ different paths. As shown in Figure 2 , aggregator first generates a random number in 1, , and represents the length of the -th data packet routed horizontally before being routed to the sink with the shortest routing approach. In this paper, horizontal routing refers to each time the node selects a node on the left (right) that is the same hops as itself from the sink as the next relay node for routing. Thus, aggregator selects its neighbor node on the left as the relay node and sends the data packet to .
selects its neighbor node following the same direction. The process proceeds until the data packet is routed to node , and the horizontal routing stops when its routing distance reaches . Starting from node , the node will select the neighbor node closest to the sink until the data packet is routed to the sink. The routing process of other ℳ − 1 data packets is the similar to the above. However, the difference is that the other ℳ − 1 data packets will select the node that has not been selected by the preceding nodes or a highly trustable node as the relay node. The routing process of notification is very similar to the routing process of a data packet because the former is generated during the routing process of the data packet. The value of ℳ for routing of data packets is usually small, for example ℳ = 2.
(3) Traceback approach
The traceback approach primarily consists of two processes: marking and logging. In the TBSR scheme, the detailed description of the marking and logging process is as follows:
Marking: For all data packets, before they reach the sink, the nodes generating the data packets and on the routing paths will be marked with a certain probability, and all nodes in the network are marked with the same probability at that time. (b) Logging: Before reaching the sink, all data packets will be logged starting from the next hop destination of the source node with a certain probability, and all nodes in the network are logged in the same probability at a given time. The probability of marking and logging at each moment is determined by the current available power. The specific value should be calculated based on sink (if ℳ>1, the data packet will be sent to the sink in a method similar to multi-path routing). Reference [58] has shown that the data aggregation method can be authenticated for each data of node. The selection of aggregator is similar to that of cluster head, which can be found in Reference [58] .
The procedure for this approach is as follows: first, an aggregator produces ℳ copies of the data packet during one operation and sends all copies to the sink through ℳ different paths. As shown in Figure 2 , aggregator first generates a random number in 1, , and represents the length of the -th data packet routed horizontally before being routed to the sink with the shortest routing approach. In this paper, horizontal routing refers to each time the node selects a node on the left (right) that is the same hops as itself from the sink as the next relay node for routing. Thus, aggregator selects its neighbor node on the left as the relay node and sends the data packet to . selects its neighbor node following the same direction. The process proceeds until the data packet is routed to node , and the horizontal routing stops when its routing distance reaches . Starting from node , the node will select the neighbor node closest to the sink until the data packet is routed to the sink. The routing process of other ℳ − 1 data packets is the similar to the above. However, the difference is that the other ℳ − 1 data packets will select the node that has not been selected by the preceding nodes or a highly trustable node as the relay node. The routing process of notification is very similar to the routing process of a data packet because the former is generated during the routing process of the data packet. The value of ℳ for routing of data packets is usually small, for example ℳ = 2.
Marking: For all data packets, before they reach the sink, the nodes generating the data packets and on the routing paths will be marked with a certain probability, and all nodes in the network are marked with the same probability at that time. (b) Logging: Before reaching the sink, all data packets will be logged starting from the next hop destination of the source node with a certain probability, and all nodes in the network are logged in the same probability at a given time. The probability of marking and logging at each moment is determined by the current available power. The specific value should be calculated based on Algorithm 1: Algorithm 1. the algorithm of obtaining available energy and obtaining the probability of marking and logging INPUT: the observed solar radiation power // ( ≥ 0) is the th day, (0 ≤ ≤ 23) is the th hour of the th day, represents the length of the i-th data packet routed horizontally before being routed to the sink with the shortest routing approach. In this paper, horizontal routing refers to each time the node selects a node on the left (right) that is the same hops as itself from the sink as the next relay node for routing. Thus, aggregator s 0 selects its neighbor node s 4 on the left as the relay node and sends the data packet to s 4 . s 4 selects its neighbor node s 5 following the same direction. The process proceeds until the data packet is routed to node s 7 , and the horizontal routing stops when its routing distance reaches sink (if ℳ>1, the data packet will be sent to the sink in a method similar to multi-path routing). Reference [58] has shown that the data aggregation method can be authenticated for each data of node. The selection of aggregator is similar to that of cluster head, which can be found in Reference [58] .
Marking: For all data packets, before they reach the sink, the nodes generating the data packets and on the routing paths will be marked with a certain probability, and all nodes in the network are marked with the same probability at that time. (b)
Logging: Before reaching the sink, all data packets will be logged starting from the next hop destination of the source node with a certain probability, and all nodes in the network are logged in the same probability at a given time. The probability of marking and logging at each moment is determined by the current available power. The specific value should be calculated based on . Starting from node s 7 , the node will select the neighbor node closest to the sink until the data packet is routed to the sink. The routing process of other M − 1 data packets is the similar to the above. However, the difference is that the other M − 1 data packets will select the node that has not been selected by the preceding nodes or a highly trustable node as the relay node. The routing process of notification is very similar to the routing process of a data packet because the former is generated during the routing process of the data packet. The value of M for routing of data packets is usually small, for example M = 2.
(a) Marking: For all data packets, before they reach the sink, the nodes generating the data packets and on the routing paths will be marked with a certain probability, and all nodes in the network are marked with the same probability at that time. (b) Logging: Before reaching the sink, all data packets will be logged starting from the next hop destination of the source node with a certain probability, and all nodes in the network are logged in the same probability at a given time. The probability of marking and logging at each moment is determined by the current available power. The specific value should be calculated based on Algorithm 1: Algorithm 1. the algorithm of obtaining available energy and obtaining the probability of marking and logging INPUT: the observed solar radiation power // d i (i ≥ 0) is the i th day, t i,j (0 ≤ j ≤ 23) is the j th hour of the i th day, // F i,j is the observed solar radiation power at t i,j ; E initial is the initial energy of the node battery, // E max is the max electricity in battery. OUTPUT: the available energy // U i,j is the available energy at t i,j ; r i,j is the remaining battery level.
(1) get available energy stage 1: Find a day with the minimum total observed solar radiation power in the whole day using the formula sum i = 23 0 F i,j dt. In addition, define this day as d 0 .
2: If
t 0,n is the time to start the sunshine.
Get e using the formula e = Einitial n+1 . Get t 0,h is the highest observed solar radiation time of the day.
If r i,j ≥ E max
If r i,j ≥ E max r i,j = E max ; Break; Case4:
If r i,j ≥ E max r i,j = E max ; Break; End if (2) get the probability of marking stage 4: For each t i,j in the set {t i,0 , t i,1 , . . . , t i, 23 
} Do
Get the probability of marking α i,j using Equation (41); End for (3) get the probability of logging stage 5: For each t i,j in the set {t i,0 , t i,1 , . . . , t i, 23 
Get the probability of logging β i,j using Equation (50) The detailed description of the TBSR scheme is provided in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2. the algorithm of a trust-based secure routing (TBSR) scheme INPUT: receive a packet // t i,j (0 ≤ j ≤ 23) is the j th hour of the i th day; U i,j is the available energy at t i,j , // α i,j is the probability of marking at t i,j , β i,j is the probability of logging at t i,j , and h is the hop from the sink. OUTPUT: Forward a new packet to next hop node (1) aggregate signature stage 1: For each node Do running aggregator determining algorithm which is similar to cluster-head selection algorithm in Reference [59] ;
End for // now, nodes either belong to aggregators or belong to member nodes 2: For each member node Do send its data and node ID, data time to its aggregator End for 3: For each aggregator node s 0 Do s 0 aggregate its member nodes' data into a data packet D 0 using ID-based aggregate signature technology as Reference [58] ; s 0 aggregate its member nodes' abstract into an abstract A 0 using ID-based aggregate signature technology as Reference [58] ; End for (2) Adopt the variable probability marking and logging α i,j , β i,j stage 4: For each receive packet P in node n h and n h is not sink Do Mark all received packets P with α i,j . // α i,j using Equation (41) . End for 5: For each receive packet P 1 generated by last node n h+1 Do Log the amount of notification in packet P 1 with β i,j . // β i,j using Equation (50); End for 6: Forward New packets P to next hop node.
Optimized Selection of Parameters
In the TBSR scheme, the two most important parameters are probability of marking and probability of logging. The values of these two parameters are critical to the whole strategy. As the above shows, the solar radiation differs at different times, so the amount of energy that can be consumed by the nodes is different. The probabilities of marking and logging are calculated based on the available energy, so we should first calculate the amount of data received and sent by nodes, then calculate the energy consumption of data sending and receiving and finally makes the energy consumption less than available energy, obtaining satisfactory probabilities of marking and logging. Theorem 1. For a planar network, assume the length of a data packet is m bits, the length of notification is b bits and the probability of marking is α . When the remaining battery level is low, the node sending the data packet will be logged with the probability of β after one hop, and the amount of data received and sent by the node that is l from the sink is represented with r x and s x respectively. Their calculation formulas are as follows:
Proof. As shown in Figure 3 , the node that is l from the sink is in the ϑ l,k area with an angle of θ k . The emission radius of the node is r, so ϑ l,k will surely receive the data generated in ϑ l+r,k area that is r from itself. In the same manner, ϑ l+r,k will receive and forward the data generated in the ϑ l+2r,k area. If the ϑ l,k area is very small, all nodes in the area can be considered loading the same amount of data.
The amount of data received by the node n x that is l from the sink is represented by R x .
Thus, the amount of data sent by each node in the , is as follows: 
where The inclusion angle between the ϑ l,k area and the sink is as small as d θk (arc), the width is assumed d x , and the ϑ l,k area is fan-shaped. However, the width is small, so in differential calculus, it can be considered a rectangle for area calculation; the length is equal to the arc length, i.e., the width of d θk l is d x . Therefore, the area of ϑ l+r,k is S ϑ l+r,k = (l + r)d θk d x . The total number of nodes in the ϑ l+r,k area is as follows:
The length of marking position is b bits, so when a data packet is sent from the ϑ l+r,k area to the ϑ l,k area, the length of the data packet is as follows:
The N ϑ l+r,k nodes in the ϑ l+r,k will surely generate N ϑ l+r,k data packets. Therefore, all data packets in the ϑ l+r,k area will be transmitted to the ϑ l,k area. The amount of data at this moment is as follows:
The area and number of nodes in the ϑ l+2r,k area are as follows:
When a data packet is transmitted from the ϑ l+2r,k area to the ϑ l,k area, the length of data packet should be as follows:
Similarly, when all data packets are sent from the ϑ l+2r,k area to the ϑ l,k area, the amount of data should be as follows:
At this time, the required storage space of each node in the ϑ l+r,k area is as follows:
The area and number of nodes of the ϑ l+3r,k area are as follows:
When a data packet is transmitted from the ϑ l+3r,k area to the ϑ l,k area, the total length of the data packet should be the following:
Similarly, when all data packets are transmitted from the ϑ l+3r,k area to the ϑ l,k area, the amount of data should be as follows:
At this time, the storage space of each node in the ϑ l+2r,k area is as follows:
Similarly, when all data packets are transmitted from the ϑ l+zr,k to the ϑ l,k , the amount of data should be the following:
At this time, the storage space of each node in the ϑ l+(z−1)r,k area equal the following:
Similarly, the amount of data received by the ϑ l,k area can be calculated as follows:
Thus, the amount of data received by each node in the ϑ l,k area can be calculated as follows:
The next step is calculating the amount of data sent by nodes. The length of data packet sent from the ϑ l,k area is as follows:
The N ϑ l,k nodes in the ϑ l,k will surely generate N ϑ l,k data packets, so the amount of data sent from the ϑ l,k area is as follows:
When a data packet is transmitted from the ϑ l+r,k area to the ϑ l,k and sent out by the ϑ l,k area, the length of data packet should be as follows:
The total number of nodes in the abovementioned ϑ l+r,k area, i.e., total number of generated data packets is
Therefore, when all data packets are transmitted from the ϑ l+r,k area to the ϑ l,k area, the amount of data should be the following:
Similarly, when a data packet is sent from the ϑ l+2r,k area to the ϑ l,k area, the length of data packet at this moment should be the following:
The number of data packets produced by the ϑ l+2r,k area is
Therefore, when all data packets are sent from the ϑ l+2r,k area to the ϑ l,k , the amount of data sent out from the area should be the following:
Similarly, when a data packet is sent from the ϑ l+zr,k area to the ϑ l,k area, the length of the data packet should be as follows:
The number of data packets generated in the ϑ l+zr,k area is
Therefore, when all data packets are transmitted from the ϑ l+zr,k area to the ϑ l,k , the amount of data sent out from the area should be the following:
Calculated in the same manner, the amount of data sent out from the ϑ l,k area is as follows:
Thus, the amount of data sent by each node in the ϑ l,k is as follows: Theorem 2. This paper adopts the simplified X-MAC energy protocol. Thus, the energy consumption of a node x tot has two parts: (1) power of data packet sent or received by the node represented by R and T ; and (2) power required for the lower power motoring operation represented by x LPL . Assuming x tot represents total energy consumption of communication and Low-Power Listening of the node that is x m from the sink in one communication period t com , x LPL represents the energy required for LPL operation, x R represents the power consumed when one node receives one data packet, x T represents the power consumption of sending one data packet, and δ x r and δ x t represent the amount of data received and sent by one node. After this paper simplifies the energy consumption of the perception stage, x tot can be calculated by the following formula:
where 
where where Figure 3 . Illustration of the information loaded by a node.
Theorem 2. This paper adopts the simplified X-MAC energy protocol.
Thus, the energy consumption of a n has two parts: (1) 
where where where where where 
where
Proof. According to the X-MAC energy consumption model, the average energy consumption of sending one data packet x T includes two parts-the energy consumption of sending the data part of the data packet and the energy consumption of a periodic preface transmission to notify the receiving node that a data packet will reach. Therefore, the average energy consumption of sending one data packet x T can be calculated by the following formula: 
According to the X-MAC energy consumption model, the average energy consumption of receiving one data packet x R can be calculated by the following formula:
The corresponding power of LPL operation can be calculated as follows:
The reason for deducting π x t and π x r from x LPL is that when the node is in active status, some time is spent on sending and receiving data and has been calculated by Equations (36) and (37), so the energy consumption during this period should be deducted in the calculation of the energy consumption of LPL operation. Obviously, the nodes closer to the sink load mode data, so they spend more time on sending and receiving data and less time on LPL operation, i.e., the deducted part π x t and π x r are larger and x LPL is smaller. In contrast, the nodes far from the sink node load less data, so they spend a long time on LPL operation, i.e., π x t and π x r are smaller and x LPL is larger. According to the X-MAC energy consumption model, π x t can be calculated as follows: 
π x r can be calculated as follows:
one data packet, and and represent the amount of data received and sent by one node. After this paper simplifies the energy consumption of the perception stage, can be calculated by the following formula:
(40) Figure 4 shows the amount of data received and sent by nodes in the network in the TBSR scheme. As the figure shows, when α = 1.0, β = 0, i.e., the probability of marking is 1 and the probability of logging is 0, the amount of data received and sent is greatly different from that in other cases. When h = 1, the amount of received data is 1.82 times the amount when α = 0.5, β = 0.5 and 2.52 times the amount when α = 1.0, β = 0. In the latter case, all nodes on the path are marked and not stored, which achieves the best security. If the network is attacked, all source nodes sending data packets and nodes on the transmission path can be found. If the node battery level is high, this case (α = 1.0, β = 0) has the highest security. However, if the level of battery remaining is low, the probability of marking should be lowered and the probability of logging should be improved to ensure the smooth transmission of data and avoid the death of a node, which will save energy due to smaller amounts of received and sent data. Hops from the sink (R=200, r=20) Figure 5 shows the analysis of the node h = 1. When = 1.0, = 0 , the electrical energy consumed by the node for receiving and sending data is 17.71 wh. When = 0.5, = 0.5, the electrical energy consumed by the node for receiving and sending data is approximately 9.15 wh. When = 0.1, = 1, the consumed electrical energy is only 6.29 wh. The last one saves 64.48% and 31.26% energy, respectively, compared with the first and second case. Solar radiation and the electrical energy compensated for the battery per hour varies under different climate conditions and environmental factors. In order to maintain the level of battery remaining above 0 or a lower limit at any time, the level of battery remaining determines the values of and we can use. As shown in Figure 5 , we can adjust the probability of marking and probability of logging to achieve different energy consumptions, thereby adapting to different climate conditions and environmental factors. Figure 5 shows the analysis of the node h = 1. When α = 1.0, β = 0, the electrical energy consumed by the node for receiving and sending data is 17.71 wh. When α = 0.5, β = 0.5, the electrical energy consumed by the node for receiving and sending data is approximately 9.15 wh. When α = 0.1, β = 1, the consumed electrical energy is only 6.29 wh. The last one saves 64.48% and 31.26% energy, respectively, compared with the first and second case. Solar radiation and the electrical energy compensated for the battery per hour varies under different climate conditions and environmental factors. In order to maintain the level of battery remaining above 0 or a lower limit at any time, the level of battery remaining determines the values of α and β we can use. As shown in Figure 5 , we can adjust the probability of marking α and probability of logging β to achieve different energy consumptions, thereby adapting to different climate conditions and environmental factors. Energy consumption (wh)
31.26% energy
Hops from the sink (R=200, r=20)    Figure 5 . Energy consumption of nodes-different hops from the sink for receiving and sending data under different probability of marking and logging. Figure 6 shows the amount of data received and sent by the node 1 hop from the sink when the probability of marking is 0.1~1 and the probability of logging is 0, 0.5 and 1. As the figure shows, when the probability of logging is the same, the amount of data and probability of marking present a positive linear correlation, so the greater the probability of marking is, the more data the node will load. In addition, a greater probability of logging results in a greater slope and faster increase in data amount. Figure 6 shows the amount of data received and sent by the node 1 hop from the sink when the probability of marking is 0.1~1 and the probability of logging is 0, 0.5 and 1. As the figure shows, when the probability of logging is the same, the amount of data and probability of marking present a positive linear correlation, so the greater the probability of marking is, the more data the node will load. In addition, a greater probability of logging results in a greater slope and faster increase in data amount. The data amount loaded by per node
The probability of marking Figure 6 . Amount of data received and sent-a node 1 hop from the sink under different probability of marking and logging. Figure 7 shows the energy consumption of the node under the conditions provided in Figure 6 . As the figure shows, when = 1, the energy consumption changes insignificantly as increases and maintains approximately 6.30 wh. In this case, although the energy consumption is small, the probability of logging is 1, i.e., the mark will be stored after the next hop, and all subsequent nodes on the routing path cannot be marked, so network security is very low. When = 0.5, the minimum energy consumption is approximately 7 wh and the maximum is approximately 12 wh. When = 0, the maximum energy consumption can approach 18 wh. If the energy is sufficient, this case will have the highest security. In conclusion, increasing can improve network security, and increasing will reduce network security, so we must determine proper values for and to save energy while ensuring higher security.
18 Figure 6 . Amount of data received and sent-a node 1 hop from the sink under different probability of marking and logging. Figure 7 shows the energy consumption of the node under the conditions provided in Figure 6 . As the figure shows, when β = 1, the energy consumption changes insignificantly as α increases and maintains approximately 6.30 wh. In this case, although the energy consumption is small, the probability of logging is 1, i.e., the mark will be stored after the next hop, and all subsequent nodes on the routing path cannot be marked, so network security is very low. When β = 0.5, the minimum energy consumption is approximately 7 wh and the maximum is approximately 12 wh. When β = 0, the maximum energy consumption can approach 18 wh. If the energy is sufficient, this case will have the highest security. In conclusion, increasing α can improve network security, and increasing β will reduce network security, so we must determine proper values for α and β to save energy while ensuring higher security. 
is approximately 7 wh and the maximum is approximately 12 wh. When = 0, the maximum energy consumption can approach 18 wh. If the energy is sufficient, this case will have the highest security. In conclusion, increasing can improve network security, and increasing will reduce network security, so we must determine proper values for and to save energy while ensuring higher security. Figure 8 shows the amount of data received and sent by the node 1 hop from the sink when the probability of logging is 0~1 and the probability of marking is 0, 0.5 and 1. As the figure shows, when the probability of marking is the same, the amount of data and probability of logging present a negative linear correlation. Thus, the greater the probability of logging is, the less data the node will Figure 8 shows the amount of data received and sent by the node 1 hop from the sink when the probability of logging is 0~1 and the probability of marking is 0, 0.5 and 1. As the figure shows, when the probability of marking is the same, the amount of data and probability of logging present a negative linear correlation. Thus, the greater the probability of logging is, the less data the node will load. In addition, a greater probability of logging results in a greater absolute value of slope and faster decrease of data amount. Figure 9 shows the energy consumption of the node under the conditions provided in Figure 8 . As the figure shows, when α = 0.1, the energy consumption changes insignificantly as β increases and maintains within 6.29~7.42 wh. load. In addition, a greater probability of logging results in a greater absolute value of slope and faster decrease of data amount. Figure 9 shows the energy consumption of the node under the conditions provided in Figure 8 . As the figure shows, when = 0.1 , the energy consumption changes insignificantly as increases and maintains within 6.29~7.42 wh. The data amount loaded by per node
The probability of logging Figure 8 . Amount of data received and sent-a node 1 hop from the sink under different logging and probability of marking.
The TBSR scheme can determine the proper probability of marking and logging based on the level of battery remaining and solar radiation, as seen in Figures 7 and 9 . Therefore, we should do further research to obtain the maximum and minimum under the same energy consumption. 
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Energy consumption (wh) The probability of logging Figure 9 . Energy consumption of the node 1 hop from the sink for receiving and sending data under different logging and probability of marking.
Theorem 3. For a planar network, assume that the length of data packet is bits and the length of notification is
bits. The node sending the data packet will be logged with the probability of after one hop, the amount of data received and sent by the node that is from the sink is represented with and respectively, the energy consumption of each node is , and the energy supplied by the battery during the period is . To ensure the energy consumption is less than or equal to the energy supplied, i.e., ≤ , the probability of marking shall meet the following conditions: Figure 9 . Energy consumption of the node 1 hop from the sink for receiving and sending data under different logging and probability of marking.
The TBSR scheme can determine the proper probability of marking and logging based on the level of battery remaining and solar radiation, as seen in Figures 7 and 9 . Therefore, we should do further research to obtain the maximum α and minimum β under the same energy consumption.
Theorem 3. For a planar network, assume that the length of data packet is m bits and the length of notification is b bits. The node sending the data packet will be logged with the probability of β after one hop, the amount of data received and sent by the node that is l from the sink is represented with r x and s x respectively, the energy consumption of each node is W tot , and the energy supplied by the battery during the period is U. To ensure the energy consumption is less than or equal to the energy supplied, i.e., W tot ≤ U, the probability of marking shall meet the following conditions:
, when β is a fixed value (41) where
Theorem 2. This paper adopts the simplified X-MAC energy protocol. Thus, the energy consumption of a node has two parts: (1) power of data packet sent or received by the node represented by and ; and (2) power required for the lower power motoring operation represented by . Assuming represents total energy consumption of communication and Low-Power Listening of the node that is m from the sink in one communication
Theorem 2. This paper adopts the simplified X-MAC energy protocol. Thus, the energy consumption of a node has two parts: (1) power of data packet sent or received by the node represented by and ; and (2) power required for the lower power motoring operation represented by . Assuming represents total energy consumption of communication and Low-Power Listening of the node that is
Theorem 2. This paper adopts the simplified X-MAC energy protocol. Thus, the energy consumption of a node
Theorem 2. This paper adopts the simplified X-MAC energy protocol. Thus, the energy consumption of a nod
where Proof. The formula is obtained based on the energy consumption:
To ensure that the energy consumption is less than the supplied energy, i.e., W tot ≤ U, the following formula is obtained:
ion period , represents the energy required for LPL operation, represents the med when one node receives one data packet, represents the power consumption of sending ket, and and represent the amount of data received and sent by one node. After this paper e energy consumption of the perception stage,
can be calculated by the following formula: 
represents the energy required for LPL operation, represents the power consumed when one node receives one data packet, represents the power consumption of sending one data packet, and and represent the amount of data received and sent by one node. After this paper simplifies the energy consumption of the perception stage,
Theorem 2. This paper adopts the simplified X-MAC energy protocol. Thus, the energy consumption of a node has two parts: (1) power of data packet sent or received by the node represented by and ; and (2) power required for the lower power motoring operation represented by . Assuming represents total energy consumption of communication and Low-Power Listening of the node that is
ϖ = ϖ + ϖ δ + ϖ δ(34)
simplifies the energy consumption of the perception stage, can be calculated by the following formula: 
Proof. The formula can be obtained according to the energy consumption model:
To ensure that the energy consumption is less than the supplied energy, i.e., W tot ≤ U, the following formula is obtained: c + (
According to Theorem 1:
Similarly, treating α as a fixed value, transpose Equation (54):
l+kr l mp k . Transpose Equation (55):
Substitute r x = µ 3 (1 − β) + ν 3 and s x = µ 4 (1 − β) + ν 4 in Equation (53): Transpose the formula:
Combining Theorem 2, to maximize the utilization of the level of battery remaining and solar radiation, we should improve network security as much as possible but control the energy consumption within the available energy, i.e., use a larger α and smaller β as possible. According to Theorems 4 and 5, we can make Figures 10-13 . Figures 10 and 11 shows the maximum value of α under different fixed β when the available energy is 7~17 wh. Figures 12 and 13 shows the minimum value of β under different fixed α when the available energy is 7~17 wh.
According to Figures 10-13 , when available energy = 7, there is one sequence containing multiple pairs (α, β) meeting the requirement of Theorem 2 as shown in the following table. Similarly, when available energy = 8, . . . , a corresponding sequence can be found. Our purpose is to find out the pair that enables the sink to receive the largest amount of notification, so this paper takes available energy = 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 as examples, removes some pairs that are obviously not the optimal options and reserves some pairs that are possibly optimal. Figure 11 . Values of probability of marking the node 1 hop from the sink when the probability of logging is a fixed value ( = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8) and the available energy is (7, 8, ⋯ , 17) Figure 10 . Values of probability of marking the node 1 hop from the sink when the probability of logging is a fixed value (β = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9) and the available energy is (7, 8, · · · , 17).
In this paper, convergence time is an important index to evaluate the TBSR scheme. Convergence time refers to the time taken by the whole synchronization process of routing information after the routers find the change in the topology structure of the network. Actually, in the TBSR scheme, convergence time is largely determined by the amount of notification that the sink can collect. When victims are attacked, they will consult the information of the upstream nodes and reconstruct the attack path in the traceback request in the form of broadcasting the malicious packet information. If the sink receives more notification, the victims can collect sufficient notification to determine the malicious node in a shorter time. In contrast, the victims must wait for another attack of the malicious node. Moreover, the data packet attacked must be marked, and the notification must be transmitted to the victims. Clearly, the more notification the sink of the network receives, the better the convergence time index will be. Therefore, this paper uses the amount of notification received by the sink to reflect the convergence time. The following Theorem 5 calculates the amount of notification received by the sink. According to Figures 10-13 , when available energy = 7, there is one sequence containing multiple pairs ( , ) meeting the requirement of Theorem 2 as shown in the following table. Similarly, when Figure 12 . Values of probability of logging the node 1 hop from the sink when the probability of marking is a fixed value (α = 1.0, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5) and the available energy is (7, 8, · · · , 17). Figure 12 . Values of probability of logging the node 1 hop from the sink when the probability of marking is a fixed value ( = 1.0, 0.9,0.8,0.7,0.6,0.5) and the available energy is (7, 8, ⋯ , 17) According to Figures 10-13 , when available energy = 7, there is one sequence containing multiple pairs ( , ) meeting the requirement of Theorem 2 as shown in the following table. Similarly, when available energy = 8, …, a corresponding sequence can be found. Our purpose is to find out the pair that enables the sink to receive the largest amount of notification, so this paper takes available energy = 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 as examples, removes some pairs that are obviously not the optimal options and reserves some pairs that are possibly optimal.
In this paper, convergence time is an important index to evaluate the TBSR scheme. Convergence time refers to the time taken by the whole synchronization process of routing information after the routers find the change in the topology structure of the network. Actually, in the TBSR scheme, convergence time is largely determined by the amount of notification that the sink can collect. When victims are attacked, they will consult the information of the upstream nodes and reconstruct the attack path in the traceback request in the form of broadcasting the malicious packet information. If the sink receives more notification, the victims can collect sufficient notification to determine the malicious node in a shorter time. In contrast, the victims must wait for another attack of the malicious node. Moreover, the data packet attacked must be marked, and the notification must be transmitted to the victims. Clearly, the more notification the sink of the network receives, the better the convergence time index will be. Therefore, this paper uses the amount of notification received by the sink to reflect the convergence time. The following Theorem 5 calculates the amount of notification received by the sink. Theorem 5. For a planar network, assuming the radius of the whole network is R, the transmission radius of a data packet is r, the success rate of each hop is p, the length of the data packet is m bits, the length of digital marking is b bits, and the node sending the data packet is logged with the probability of β after one hop. The amount of notification received by the sink is as follows:
Proof. The amount of notification received by the sink is the product of the amount of data sent by the node 1 hop from the sink and p. The amount of notification sent by the node that is l from the sink is as follows:
(61) l = hr + x, so the above formula can be converted to the following:
Therefore, the amount of notification sent by each node of h = 1 is as follows:
The amount of notification received by the sink in the whole area is as follows: The above analysis of the amount of notification received by the sink is actually an analysis of convergence time because the more notification the sink of the network receives, the shorter convergence time will be. In the TBSR scheme, the storage space of the node will also be considered in addition to convergence time. If too much notification is stored in a node, the strategy is not perfect. The following calculates the amount of notification stored in each node.
Theorem 6. For a planar network, assuming the length of data packet is m bits and the length of digital marking is b bits, the node sending the data packet and notification will be logged with the probability of β after one hop, and the amount of notification stored in each node is as follows:
Proof. It can be obtained from the proof process of Theorem 1 that each node only logs the notification of the starting node of the last hop. The amount of notification sent by the starting node of last hop and received by the current node is bαp; the current node is logged with the probability of β, so the amount of notification stored in a node at a certain moment is βbαp. The accumulated amount of notification at any time in a day should be calculated through time integration, i.e., ξ = t 0 βbαpdt.
As shown in the theorem, in the TBSR scheme, the logged notification is distributed over the whole network, so that only a small number of notifications are stored in each node and the stored notification will be sent out the next day, so the node has a light load, which proves the good performance of the TBSR scheme.
According to Theorem 5, we can select one from all satisfactory (α, β) pairs to achieve the best network security, i.e., the (α, β) pair with the maximum convergence time. As shown in Table 2 in the last section, five (α, β) pairs meet the requirement of available energy = 7 wh. After calculating the convergence time of the five pairs, we determine that (0.6, 0.9) has the maximum convergence time and best security. Similarly, we can also find the (α, β) that achieves the best security when the available energy is another value. The following Table 3 shows the (α, β) with best security obtained through calculation. Table 2 . Candidate pairs for the node of h = 1.
Available Energy (wh)
(ff, fi) The above is our analysis on two indexes of the TBSR scheme-convergence time and storage space of a node. In the following part, we will analyze the performance of the TBSR scheme based on the actual situation. 
Performance Analysis

Experimental Result
The following Table 4 shows the experiment conditions and selected parameters: We assume the length of the data packet after aggregation as 500 and the length of notification as 100. We select the solar energy receiver in dimensions of 10 cm × 20 cm. The initial level and maximum level of the node battery are 55 wh and 111 wh, respectively.
First, we select the first day from the data of the Solar Radiation Laboratory of Texas, USA [60] , based on the TBSR scheme (The TBSR scheme requires the first day to be the day with the least solar radiation in recent years), select the remaining 11 days randomly and draw Figure 14 under the above conditions. As shown in the figure, the minimum level of the node battery remaining is 7 wh according to the energy consumption plan of the TBSR scheme, and it appears on the first day. On any later day, the remaining energy of the node battery is over 20 wh, and the battery can be fully charged every day. We assume the length of the data packet after aggregation as 500 and the length of notification as 100. We select the solar energy receiver in dimensions of 10 cm × 20 cm. The initial level and maximum level of the node battery are 55 wh and 111 wh, respectively.
First, we select the first day from the data of the Solar Radiation Laboratory of Texas, USA [60] , based on the TBSR scheme (The TBSR scheme requires the first day to be the day with the least solar radiation in recent years), select the remaining 11 days randomly and draw Figure 14 under the above conditions. As shown in the figure, the minimum level of the node battery remaining is 7 wh according to the energy consumption plan of the TBSR scheme, and it appears on the first day. On any later day, the remaining energy of the node battery is over 20 wh, and the battery can be fully charged every day. Figure 14 . The nodes closer to the sink load the greatest amounts of data and consume the most energy, so we analyze the node 1 hop from the sink first. Under the experiment conditions of Figure 14 and according to the TBSR scheme, we can obtain the probability of marking and logging of the node 1 hop from the sink at different times. Figure 15 shows the change of probability of marking and logging of the node 1 hop from the sink in each hour of the first day. According to Figure 15 , from 1 to 7 o'clock, ( , ) = (0.6, 0.9), from 8 to 13 o'clock, ( , ) = (1, 0) and from 14 to 24 o'clock, ( , ) = (0.6, 0.9). Therefore, (0.6, 0.9) is the best solution to ensure network security when the energy consumption is 7 wh and (1, 0) the best solution when the remaining battery level is high. Figure 16 shows the change of probability of marking and logging of the node 1 hop from the sink in one week. The value of ( , ) is similar to that of the first day. Figures 15 and 16 show the analysis conducted based on Figure 14 . The nodes closer to the sink load the greatest amounts of data and consume the most energy, so we analyze the node 1 hop from the sink first. Under the experiment conditions of Figure 14 and according to the TBSR scheme, we can obtain the probability of marking and logging of the node 1 hop from the sink at different times. Figure 15 shows the change of probability of marking and logging of the node 1 hop from the sink in each hour of the first day. According to Figure 15, from 1 to 7 o'clock, ( , ) = (0.6, 0.9 Figure 16 shows the change of probability of marking and logging of the node 1 hop from the sink in one week. The value of ( , ) is similar to that of the first day. 
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The probability of marking The probability of logging Figure 15 . Change of probability of marking and logging of the node 1 hop from the sink in the first day. Figure 15 . Change of probability of marking and logging of the node 1 hop from the sink in the first day. Figure 16 . Change of probability of marking and logging of the node 1 hop from the sink in one week.
Based on Figures 14-16 and Theorem 1, we can draw the amount of data sent by each node 1, 2 and 3 hops from the sink in the first day as shown in Figure 17 . Figure 17 shows that the closer the node is to the sink; the more data is sent. According to Figure 15 , in the period of 8-13 h, the probability of marking is high and the probability of logging is low. Therefore, in Figure 17 , the amount of data during this period of 8-13 h is significantly greater than at other times. In order to maintain the level of battery remaining above 0 or a lower limit at any time, we must consider the change of the remaining battery level of the nodes. As shown in Figure 18 , in 12 days, taking the nodes 1, 2 and 3 hops from the sink as examples, the level of battery remaining is always over 0 wh and the battery can be charged once a day. Based on the observation of Figure 18 and a further analysis, we find that the nodes farther from the sink have more remaining battery level at any time because they load fewer amounts of data and consume less energy. Therefore, if the battery of the node 1 hop from the sink can be kept in use, the same parameters can be applied to other nodes of the network to avoid the death of these nodes. According to Figure 17 , we can also draw the change of the amount of notification received by the sink in the first day as shown in Figure 19 . From 8 to 13 o'clock, the sink clearly receives a large amount of notification, and the network achieves favorable security. Figure 15 shows the change of probability of marking and logging of the node 1 hop from the sink in each hour of the first day. According to Figure 15 , from 1 to 7 o'clock, (α, β) = (0.6, 0.9), from 8 to 13 o'clock, (α, β) = (1, 0) and from 14 to 24 o'clock, (α, β) = (0.6, 0.9). Therefore, (0.6, 0.9) is the best solution to ensure network security when the energy consumption is 7 wh and (1, 0) the best solution when the remaining battery level is high. Figure 16 shows the change of probability of marking and logging of the node 1 hop from the sink in one week. The value of (α, β) is similar to that of the first day.
Based on Figures 14-16 and Theorem 1, we can draw the amount of data sent by each node 1, 2 and 3 hops from the sink in the first day as shown in Figure 17 . Figure 17 shows that the closer the node is to the sink; the more data is sent. According to Figure 15 , in the period of 8-13 h, the probability of marking is high and the probability of logging is low. Therefore, in Figure 17 , the amount of data during this period of 8-13 h is significantly greater than at other times. In order to maintain the level of battery remaining above 0 or a lower limit at any time, we must consider the change of the remaining battery level of the nodes. As shown in Figure 18 , in 12 days, taking the nodes 1, 2 and 3 hops from the sink as examples, the level of battery remaining is always over 0 wh and the battery can be charged once a day. Based on the observation of Figure 18 and a further analysis, we find that the nodes farther from the sink have more remaining battery level at any time because they load fewer amounts of data and consume less energy. Therefore, if the battery of the node 1 hop from the sink can be kept in use, the same parameters can be applied to other nodes of the network to avoid the death of these nodes. According to Figure 17 , we can also draw the change of the amount of notification received by the sink in the first day as shown in Figure 19 . From 8 to 13 o'clock, the sink clearly receives a large amount of notification, and the network achieves favorable security.
node is to the sink; the more data is sent. According to Figure 15 , in the period of 8-13 h, the probability of marking is high and the probability of logging is low. Therefore, in Figure 17 , the amount of data during this period of 8-13 h is significantly greater than at other times. In order to maintain the level of battery remaining above 0 or a lower limit at any time, we must consider the change of the remaining battery level of the nodes. As shown in Figure 18 , in 12 days, taking the nodes 1, 2 and 3 hops from the sink as examples, the level of battery remaining is always over 0 wh and the battery can be charged once a day. Based on the observation of Figure 18 and a further analysis, we find that the nodes farther from the sink have more remaining battery level at any time because they load fewer amounts of data and consume less energy. Therefore, if the battery of the node 1 hop from the sink can be kept in use, the same parameters can be applied to other nodes of the network to avoid the death of these nodes. According to Figure 17 , we can also draw the change of the amount of notification received by the sink in the first day as shown in Figure 19 . From 8 to 13 o'clock, the sink clearly receives a large amount of notification, and the network achieves favorable security. 
Performance Comparison with the Traceback with Stationary Parameter Scheme
In the TBSR scheme, the probability of marking and logging will vary with the available energy, which results in effectively utilizing the energy and thereby improving network security and reliability. The traceback scheme in the paper adopts the fixed probability of marking and logging (traceback with stationary parameter scheme, known as the TWSP scheme). Next, we compare the performance of these two schemes in four aspects. 
In the TBSR scheme, the probability of marking and logging will vary with the available energy, which results in effectively utilizing the energy and thereby improving network security and reliability. The traceback scheme in the paper adopts the fixed probability of marking and logging (traceback with stationary parameter scheme, known as the TWSP scheme). Next, we compare the Figure 19 . Change of the amount of notification received by the sink on the first day.
In the TBSR scheme, the probability of marking and logging will vary with the available energy, which results in effectively utilizing the energy and thereby improving network security and reliability. The traceback scheme in the paper adopts the fixed probability of marking and logging (traceback with stationary parameter scheme, known as the TWSP scheme). Next, we compare the performance of these two schemes in four aspects.
(1) Comparison of convergence time
The following compares the amount of marking received cumulatively by sink (actually also the comparison of convergence time):
Figures 20-22 shows the comparison of convergence time between the TBSR scheme and the TWSP scheme. As shown in Figure 20 , at the same moment, the sink receives more notification in the TBSR scheme than in the TWSP scheme, and as time elapses, the accumulated amount of notification received by the sink under the two schemes presents an increasing difference. Figure 21 shows the amount of notification received by the sink in the TBSR scheme further calculated based on Figure 20 , which increases approximately 20% compared with the amount of notification received by the sink in the TWSP scheme. Figure 22 shows the length of accumulated notification received by the sink in the TBSR scheme after 12 days that is further calculated based on Figure 20 , which is 8 × 10 9 greater than that in the TWSP scheme. When the sink in the network receives more notification, the convergence time index will be more favorable and the network will be more reliable, so the TBSR scheme has higher security. As shown in Figure 23 , at the same moment, the accumulated energy consumption in the TBSR scheme as time elapses is greater than that in the TWSP scheme because in the TBSR scheme, the probabilities of marking and logging are changeable. During the several hours in a day when the available energy is sufficient, we improve the probability of marking and reduce the probability of logging, so the node consumes more energy than it consumes at other times. However, in the TWSP scheme, the probabilities of marking and logging are fixed and selected based on the minimum available energy to avoid the death of the node. Further analysis shows that the nodes can make better use of the available energy in the TBSR scheme. As shown in Figure 24 , the energy availability of the TWSP scheme is approximately 20%, but the energy availability of the TBSR scheme is as high as greater than 30%. Figure 25 shows the increase of energy availability in the TBSR scheme compared with that in the TWSP scheme. Figure 25 clearly shows that the availability is increased by approximately 11%. Therefore, the TBSR scheme has higher energy availability and better performance. As shown in Figure 26 , in the TBSR scheme, the amount of stored notification does not increase during a certain period because in this period, the probability of logging is 0 and no notification is stored. Figure 27 shows the storage space saved for nodes in the TBSR scheme compared with the TWSP scheme. As the figure shows, the length of notification saved by the TBSR scheme in one day is near 400. Therefore, the TBSR scheme can save more storage space and provide better performance. As shown in Figure 23 , at the same moment, the accumulated energy consumption in the TBSR scheme as time elapses is greater than that in the TWSP scheme because in the TBSR scheme, the probabilities of marking and logging are changeable. During the several hours in a day when the available energy is sufficient, we improve the probability of marking and reduce the probability of logging, so the node consumes more energy than it consumes at other times. However, in the TWSP scheme, the probabilities of marking and logging are fixed and selected based on the minimum available energy to avoid the death of the node. Further analysis shows that the nodes can make better use of the available energy in the TBSR scheme. As shown in Figure 24 , the energy availability of the TWSP scheme is approximately 20%, but the energy availability of the TBSR scheme is as high as greater than 30%. Figure 25 shows the increase of energy availability in the TBSR scheme compared with that in the TWSP scheme. Figure 25 clearly shows that the availability is increased by approximately 11%. Therefore, the TBSR scheme has higher energy availability and better performance. As shown in Figure 26 , in the TBSR scheme, the amount of stored notification does not increase during a certain period because in this period, the probability of logging is 0 and no notification is This section analyzes the calculation of arrival rates in the TWSP scheme and the TBSR scheme and a performance comparison of two schemes. As mentioned above, more notification will result in shorter convergence time and higher security during the traceback. In this case, the sink can find the secure transmission path more easily using the received notification. In other words, a greater probability of marking leads to higher trust, i.e., a greater success rate of the transmission of each hop. sink (if ℳ>1, the data packet will be sent to the sink in a method similar to multi-path routing). Reference [58] has shown that the data aggregation method can be authenticated for each data of node. The selection of aggregator is similar to that of cluster head, which can be found in Reference [58] .
(3) Traceback approach
Marking: For all data packets, before they reach the sink, the nodes generating the data packets and on the routing paths will be marked with a certain probability, and all nodes in the network are marked with the same probability at that time. (b) Logging: Before reaching the sink, all data packets will be logged starting from the next hop destination of the source node with a certain probability, and all nodes in the network are logged in the same probability at a given time. The probability of marking and logging at each moment is determined by the current available power. The specific value should be calculated based on Algorithm 1: Algorithm 1. the algorithm of obtaining available energy and obtaining the probability of marking and logging }. The expected number of hops of the horizontal routing is W 14 of 42
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(2) A data and notification disjoint routing approach This section primarily discusses how to effectively route the data packet and notice message to the sink, i.e., a data and notification disjoint routing approach. ℳ data packets are sent each time using the multi-path routing scheme, and notification is generated for each data packet during the routing process through marking. Both data packet and notification are routed to the sink.
Logging: Before reaching the sink, all data packets will be logged starting from the next hop destination of the source node with a certain probability, and all nodes in the network are logged in the same probability at a given time. The probability of marking and logging at each moment is determined by the current available power. The specific value should be calculated based on Algorithm 1: /2. Assuming the number of sent data packets is M, the number of notice messages must be the same as that of data packets, i.e., M. We adopt the TWSP scheme and the TBSR scheme for routing, respectively. Assuming the success rate of each hop in the TWSP scheme is p and the trust increased by the successful transmission of each hop in the TBSR scheme is ∂, the arrival rate of a data packet is π 1 h and π 2 h respectively in the TWSP scheme and the TBSR scheme:
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In this paper, a secure routing scheme using the traceback approach for energy-harvesting sensor networks is proposed to maximize the use of available energy to improve data security and integrity. First, the aggregate signature approach is used to aggregate data and maintain data integrity. Then, a data and notification disjoint routing approach is proposed to improve the probability of the data reaching the sink safely. However, a scheme based only on these two approaches cannot determine the location of a malicious node. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a scheme integrating the traceback scheme and combining the ID-based aggregate signature approach with multi-path routing of data packets and notification, which not only reduces the energy consumption but also ensures data security and integrity. The improvements of the past traceback scheme proposed by this paper in the TBSR include the following: when available energy of nodes is sufficient, a higher probability of marking and a lower probability of logging are used. Thus, the sink can obtain more notification, which will improve network security. Because if the probability of will be sent to the sink in a method similar to multi-path routing). Reference ggregation method can be authenticated for each data of node. The selection t of cluster head, which can be found in Reference [58] .
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In this paper, a secure routing scheme using the traceback approach for energy-harvesting sensor networks is proposed to maximize the use of available energy to improve data security and integrity. First, the aggregate signature approach is used to aggregate data and maintain data integrity. Then, a data and notification disjoint routing approach is proposed to improve the probability of the data reaching the sink safely. However, a scheme based only on these two approaches cannot determine the location of a malicious node. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a scheme integrating the traceback scheme and combining the ID-based aggregate signature approach with multi-path routing of data packets and notification, which not only reduces the energy consumption but also ensures data security and integrity. The improvements of the past traceback scheme proposed by this paper in the TBSR include the following: when available energy of nodes is sufficient, a higher probability of marking and a lower probability of logging are used. Thus, the sink can obtain more notification, which will improve network security. Because if the probability of marking is higher, the number of marked nodes on the data packet routing path will be more, and the sink will be more likely to trace back the data packet routing path and find malicious nodes according to this notification. When data packets are routed again, they tend to bypass these malicious nodes, which make the success rate of routing higher and lead to improved network security. In contrast, when available energy of nodes is insufficient, a lower probability of marking and a higher probability of logging are used, which stores the notification on the nodes of the network instead of sending it to the sink immediately. Thus, when the level of battery remaining is low, less data is transmitted in the network, which saves energy. When the level of battery remaining is enough, the notification logged on the nodes of the network will be transmitted to the sink. This approach significantly improves the overall security of the system and energy availability. Finally, the TBSR scheme uses the malicious node location function based on traceback to reduce the trust of the malicious node and to guide the data to avoid the nodes with low trust to further improve the system security. The results of our strict theoretic analysis show that, compared with the ordinary traceback scheme (TWSP scheme), the TBSR scheme can increase the amount of notification received by the sink by approximately 20%, increase the energy availability by approximately 11%, reduce the maximum storage capacity of the node by 33.3% and improve the routing success rate by approximately 16.30%. It therefore has better performance.
